Perception Workshop (Bain, Corns & Gray)

As part of the Research Seminar Series, on May 4th we will have a workshop on perception, focusing on pain. The event is in Room 0.01 (one door down from the usual), from 1-6pm, in the John Percival Building.This will be another great event, so not to be missed! Speakers and titles below.

David Bain (Glasgow): Why take painkillers?

Jennifer Corns (Glasgow): Pain is not a natural kind

Richard Gray (Cardiff): Pain and perception

UPDATE BELOW: Chon Tejedor (Hertfordshire) ‘Science in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’

The talk below was cancelled, so Jon Webber (Cardiff) will be speaking at the same time (Wednesday April 27th, 4.15-5.45pm in Room 0.02, John Percival Building), on ‘Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions’. Abstract below.

Jon Webber (Cardiff)
Title: Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions
 Abstract: This talk is focused on a puzzle about Part III of Sartre’s short early book Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions — does he really sketch one theory, or are there in fact two different theories in here?
This question has been getting quite some attention recently, including two papers in Analysis of all places.
I think this talk will appeal not only to people interested in Sartre or phenomenology more generally, but also to anyone interested in emotion and affectivity, or in philosophy of mind generally, as well as anyone interested in the whole post-Kantian transcendental shebang.

The next research seminar is on Wednesday April 27th, where Chon Tejedor will be speaking on ‘Science in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus‘. Usual time and place of 4.15-5.45pm in Room 0.02, John Percival Building.

Abstract: In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s early discussion of the principles of the natural sciences – a discussion which is divided in the Tractatus into a negative section and a positive one. In the former, Wittgenstein seeks to establish that the notion of natural necessity is self-stultifying, insofar as it relies on an understanding of logical operations that it simultaneously attempts to subvert. Hence, the principles of the natural sciences should not be understood as capturing such a notion. In his positive discussion, Wittgenstein suggests that the principles of the natural sciences are both a priori and optional, in that they provide instructions or stipulations for the generation of senseful propositions within particular scientific systems. Wittgenstein’s treatment of the principles of the natural sciences leads him to some intriguing conclusions on causation and induction.

 

Some of this material is covered in: Chon Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein on Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value (Routledge, 2015): chaps. 4 & 5.

The book will be out in paperback in the summer.